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ralHistories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Mr. Arend ‘‘Pete’’ Reid was Chief of
the Combat Support Division, Army Mate-
riel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA),
from 1982 to 1996. He was appointed to
the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 1982
and given the Presidential Rank Award in
1989 for Meritorious Executive. Mr. Reid
was inducted into the Army Operations
Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA) Hall
of Fame in October 2008. The interview
was conducted on May 2, 2009, with Mr.
Reid and Mr. Bill Dunn, FS, in Fallston,
Maryland; participating via telephone were
Mr. Mike Garrambone in Dayton, Ohio,
and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, in Burke, Virginia.
This article includes both an interview of
Mr. Reid as well as his remarks at the
MORS Heritage Session at the 70th MORS
Symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
June 20, 2002.
Bill Dunn: It’s May 2, 2009, and I’m in
Fallston, Maryland to interview Pete Reid.
Mike Garrambone and Bob Sheldon are
with us on the telephone. Pete, tell us how
you got the nickname ‘‘Pete’’?
Pete Reid: I just adopted it because peo-
ple didn’t pronounce my real name, Arend,
correctly.
Bill Dunn: Why Pete? Why not Bill or
Bob?
Pete Reid: Why not? Just out of thin air.
Bill Dunn: You didn’t have an uncle or
a friend or a hero on TV?
Pete Reid: No. [Laughs] I just went back
to college my sophomore year and said,
‘‘Call me Pete Reid.’’ They were all greatly
relieved to not have to try to pronounce
my first name.
Bill Dunn: What did your parents call
you?
Pete Reid: My dad occasionally did call
me Pete. My mother continued to call me
my given name, which she did pronounce
correctly, by the way, and she was a personal
friend of the Arend whose name was as-
signed to me. The friend’s name was Arend
Antonius Yakaminus Korteweg.
Bill Dunn: Have you ever met any other
Arends?
Pete Reid: Actually yes, there’s one in
our church. Cal Ripken’s younger brother
has a son named Arend. He is named for
their Dutch grandfather.
Bill Dunn: I don’t remember anybody
but you with that name.
Pete Reid: Well it probably wouldn’t
stick with you.
Bill Dunn: Where were you born and
what were your parents’ names?
Pete Reid: I was born in Richmond,
Indiana, at home. My mother’s name was
Madge and my father’s name was Wayne.
Bill Dunn: Tell us about your early
years. What schools did you go to?
Pete Reid: I went to the public schools
in Richmond. I walked to kindergarten and
the first four years of elementary school.
Then we moved to the country just outside
Richmond on a small farm. I walked to fifth
and sixth grades, which was probably a
half mile away. I rode the school bus to ju-
nior high and also to senior high school in
Richmond.
Bill Dunn: What did your parents do?
Pete Reid: My father did calculations
concerning the speeds of automated dril-
ling equipment for the National Automated
Tool Company (NATCO) in Richmond. He
would calculate the rate at which the tool
should be fed into the materials and drilled
or shaped, and also the rate of speed of the
drill bits. A lot of the equipment was used
during World War II (WW II) and then sub-
sequently a lot of their equipment became
part of the Marshall Plan. The NATCO
tools were used by the automotive indus-
try worldwide. My mother was the chair-
man of the Red Cross in Richmond for
15 years, including all of the WW II years.
Both before and afterward, she was a
school teacher. Before she graduated from
college she was hired to teach English in
the public schools in Indiana at the high
school level and then in later years she be-
came an elementary school teacher and also
an art teacher.
Bill Dunn: Was your father an engineer?
Pete Reid: He was not a college gradu-
ate. He went to Earlham College for two
years and then dropped out. He learned
enough to use a slide rule and understand
the calculations having to do with machines
that were manufactured by the NATCO.
Bill Dunn: Having your dad familiar
with slide rules and such, did that pique
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Pete Reid: I think everyone in the 1940s and
1950s was familiar with slide rules. I don’t know
whether it was the fact that my father gave me
a couple of slide rules. Whether it was the fact
that he used them was an influence or not, I
can’t say.
Bill Dunn: Did it spark an interest in physics
or engineering or mathematics?
Pete Reid: I used to enjoy going to visit his
companies (during WW II my father worked
at a tool and component manufacturing com-
pany in Dayton, Ohio), and see the sorts of
things that they did. I just assumed that every-
body did that sort of thing. Both parents and
my grandmothers were very influential in tell-
ing me that I would be going to college. The only
question was where. I had a scholarship offer at
the University of Cincinnati, but I elected to go
to Purdue. The cost for one semester’s tuition
for an in-state student at Purdue at that time
was $65 per semester. I thought the $1,000 cost
they charged an out-of-state student was out
of sight.
Bill Dunn: How far was Purdue from
Richmond?
Pete Reid: It was about 140 miles to West
Lafayette, Indiana. I hitchhiked about 100 times.
I would never dream of doing it today.
Bill Dunn: Those were the good old days.
Pete Reid: Yes. All the kids hitchhiked for the
first couple of years until they got cars.
Mike Garrambone: What did you study in
high school that led you to get into a fine school
like Purdue, and when did you graduate?
Pete Reid: The choices in high school were
academic or otherwise, so I just took the aca-
demic coursework. I had high school chemistry
and physics and I especially enjoyed mathemat-
ics. I graduated in 1951 from Richmond Senior
High School.
Bill Dunn: What did you choose as a major
at Purdue?
Pete Reid: I started out in aeronautical en-
gineering and changed to air transportation
engineering, which is essentially industrial
engineering oriented to the aviation industry.
Remember there were a lot of pretty bright
people there the same time I was, people like
Gene Cernan and Neil Armstrong and not
too many years before was Amelia Earhart.
In fact the author of Cheaper by the Dozen,
Frank Gilbreth, lived in a house on campus.
The brightness sort of rubbed off on the other
students.
Bill Dunn: Your diploma was in air trans-
portation engineering?
Pete Reid: Right.
Bill Dunn: Did they have an operations re-
search (OR) curriculum there at the time?
Pete Reid: I don’t recall if they had any. The
first time I came across a school that had courses
that were called OR was after I was working
at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG). Johns
Hopkins had it in their McCoy College and I
took some of their courses.
Bill Dunn: Were there any courses in in-
dustrial engineering that were similar to ORSA
(Operations Research/Systems Analysis) that
you remember?
Pete Reid: Practically everything that has to
do with engineering is similar to ORSA.
Bill Dunn: Good answer. When you were
finishing at Purdue, did they have a job fair or
a placement service?
Pete Reid: They had an excellent placement
service. I took part in many interviews. I chose
to go with the Kawneer Company in Niles,
Michigan. All of you have touched Kawneer
products thousands of times. Every time you
go to an aluminum glass store front, you’re
opening a door that was probably built by
Kawneer. There are very few exceptions. Look
at the kick plate and you’ll see K-a-w-n-e-e-r.
The name comes from the Kaw River just west
of Missouri, near where the original factory
was built. Then it moved to Michigan. At the
time I was with Kawneer, they had contracts
with almost all of the major airplane and heli-
copter manufacturers because the company
had invented the process of bonding curved
surface honeycomb panels.
Honeycomb is a structural body that is ex-
tremely lightweight and is used in a great
many applications: in airfoil, wing, fuselage
and floor plate in aircraft and helicopters.
It’s also used in other things like walls around
Link trainers, but the biggie is their wonderful
invention of a very simple method of curved
surfaces bonded in honeycomb panels. They
had contracts with Republic, Boeing, Vertol,
Piasecki, Sikorsky, Martin and other aircraft
manufacturers.
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Bill Dunn: What was your job there?
Pete Reid: I was a trainee. I was only there for
a few months before the Army called. I almost
caused a wildcat strike one morning when I
picked up a part that needed to be reworked
and carried it over to the rework bench. That
was not a good thing for a person who did not
belong to the union to do. You had to go get
a union member to carry that part over. They
saw the wisdom of not going out on strike, but
they threatened to. I carried the part back and
let the union guy carry it back over.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of training were
they giving you?
Pete Reid: Anything in their manufacturing
process, really, anything that an industrial en-
gineer would do. They also had aluminum an-
odizing capabilities. One of the large aircraft
manufacturers invented the process of anod-
izing aluminum. Kawneer got licensed to do
anodizing in exchange for curved surface hon-
eycomb panels work that they did for that avi-
ation company. So I worked on anodizing and I
worked on the machining of the honeycomb
panels.
Ironically, I learned later that the material
used that allowed the panels to be glued to
a curved aluminum surface was made by
Bloomingdale Rubber Company right here in
Harford County, Maryland.
Bill Dunn:How long were you with Kawneer?
Pete Reid: From early February through
April 1956. I would’ve been there a bit longer ex-
cept that I had to have an appendectomy. I was
in the hospital having my appendix out the day
that I graduated from college in January 1956.
Bill Dunn:Did you get a letter in the mail that
said, ‘‘Please report to a military induction’’?
Pete Reid: Right. My draft board was very
fair. They told everybody they would give you
four years to go get a college degree and after
that they would draft you . and that’s what
they did. I knew one classmate who didn’t hear
from them so he went in and asked. It turned
out that they had lost his information behind
their file cabinets. He was drafted a couple of
weeks after he went in and asked about it. Oth-
erwise, he would never have gone on active
duty, I guess. They had lost him completely.
I took a train to St. Louis and I had basic
training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. At the
end of basic training, they sent some of the peo-
ple with engineering degrees to White Sands
Missile Range, New Mexico, and some of them
to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois. I was sent to
APG, Maryland. I had never heard of it at the
time, but they told me how to find it, and find
it I did.
Bill Dunn: Did you have any choice in that
or they just selected it for you?
Pete Reid: No choice that I’m aware of.
Bill Dunn: What was your military occupa-
tional specialty (MOS)?
Pete Reid: My MOS was actually that of an
aeronautical engineer.
Bob Sheldon: With your aeronautical back-
ground, did you ever think about joining the
Air Force instead of the Army?
Pete Reid: I don’t remember whether I did or
not. Actually I was in Naval Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) for a while. We had
some interesting people running that operation.
Chief petty officers regard themselves as rulers
of the earth. I didn’t like it, so I dropped out of
that.
Bill Dunn: After you were drafted in the
Army, did you ever give any thought to try to
be an officer?
Pete Reid: Yes I did, and I learned through
my time at Aberdeen that the GIs got the better
assignments. It was awfully hard for a lieutenant
to get an assignment at the Ballistic Research
Laboratory (BRL). For GIs with an engineering
degree or a degree in physics and math it was
easy, very easy. BRL just wanted them to be
assigned to the scientific and professional series
of jobs and they had many such jobs.
We were in a whole company of young men
who had degrees in engineering, physics, and
math—well over 100 in the barracks area where
I stayed, and the lieutenants that were there
were very few in number. One company com-
mander had to run the company. He was never
allowed to go into BRL and work even though
he had an engineering degree. He really envied
those of us who were able to do it, so it was an
easy choice for me to remain a GI.
Mike Garrambone: What did you work on as
an engineer?
Pete Reid: I was assigned to a Special
Weapons Evaluation Branch and we had the re-
sponsibility for what you may have heard about
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as high fragmentation weapons. High fragmen-
tation weapons provided very energetic, very
small fragments. They manifested themselves
in air delivered ordnance, bomblets, small
bomblets, and artillery shells. They also work
on the metallurgy for the field artillery shells
to break up into extremely small high energy
fragments.
As Wilbur Payne used to point out, almost
all of us back in the beginning worked on nu-
clear weapons and I was one of those who did.
I worked on the Honest John trivariate fuze
burst point distribution. It was one of the first
job assignments I had. I also was on the study
called The Future Role of Guided Missiles. The
best tutor that I ever had, Roger Willis, led that
and many other studies in the BRL Weapons
Systems Laboratory. I worked on the compari-
son of the Lance missile and the F-4C tactical
aircraft. I noticed that the artillery people were
working with targets that were described as ar-
bitrarily chosen (size) rectangles, circles, and
lines, and I started worrying about what they
would really look like on the battlefield. I got
some maps and started plotting the various
units on the maps.
The Continental Army Command (CONARC)
liaison officer, Colonel Larry Lingerer came by,
poked his head in my office one day and saw
that I had maps up on the wall. I’d stand on
top of my desk and work on them with a grease
pencil, and he became interested. He was a
combat arms officer stationed at Aberdeen rep-
resenting CONARC, and it got so he would
stop by at the end of his workday. Every day
he’d come by at about 4:30 and he and I would
work together on the deployments and we cre-
ated the first set of what we called target arrays.
They were the first set of realistic target arrays
for use in the evaluation of field artillery sys-
tems and we created one set for non-nuclear
weapons and a totally separate set for nuclear
weapons.
The deployments were grouped differently
out of respect to the fact that nuclear weapons
can cause a lot of damage even when they’re
fractional yields and used at safe distances from
friendly troops. Later, after I was off active duty
I started traveling to other places to get more
help. I went to CONARC and found a wargam-
ing group there that was doing some interesting
things. I went to Fort Sill, Oklahoma and we de-
veloped a whole bunch of tools for analysts of
artillery weapons to use—we improved on the
arbitrary methods they had been using before
that.
Bill Dunn: BRL was one of the leaders in
computer development. What computers did
you use there at BRL?
Pete Reid: The first computer, the Electronic
Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC),
was developed at the University of Pennsylva-
nia under the supervision of some of the wiz-
ards in BRL. You can see parts of it on display
here and there, and they put parts of it at the
Smithsonian. When I arrived in 1956 they were
on the second generation of a mainframe, the
Ordnance Discrete Variable Automatic Com-
puter (ORDVAC). I used that for a lot of calcula-
tions. You had to punch what they called IBM
cards with instructions and certain people knew
how to wire up the analog parts and machines
to cause it to do the calculations you wanted it
to do. I was using that machine to do various
and sundry things like calculating nuclear
safety distances.
It was just great anticipation. Every morn-
ing you would rush into work to see whether
or not they had gotten your problem run over-
night. The only time you got any running time
on the machine was overnight. They used the
daytime to do maintenance work and so on.
So you’d hurry in there in the morning to see
whether or not you had a stack of paper there
in the little bins where you got output. Then
you knew that your problem had run that
night and you could look at it and decide what
to run the next night. That was quite an excit-
ing time, the simple act of getting in there
and finding out whether or not your problem
was in there.
Bill Dunn: Did you have to punch your own
cards or did you have some key punch people
that helped you out?
Pete Reid: We had keypunch people. If you
were in a big hurry, you could do it yourself.
We had our own keypunch machines in our
building. They had a whole section of keypunch
ladies in the building where the computers were
housed.
Bob Sheldon: What was your military rank
when you were enlisted?
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Pete Reid: When I finished my tour of active
duty I was Specialist 5, the equivalent of Ser-
geant. I started out at E-1. All you soldiers will
know what that means. I started out at the very
bottom.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of paycheck did you
bring home as a Specialist 5?
Pete Reid: I don’t remember exactly. I played
in a dance band to supplement the income and
my wife always had a job. She actually worked
for the laboratory chief as his secretary for more
than a year. We had been married before I went
on active duty, in fact, prior to my last semester
of college. One of the company sergeants was
just leaving when I got there and he was kind
enough to let me buy all his furniture for $100.
The first thing my wife did when she arrived
was throw almost all of that away.
We rented a house in Aberdeen. She drove
out with some furnishings and bought some
more later. We lived in Aberdeen for a while
and then we moved into Wherry/Capehart
housing. The Wherry and Capehart housing
initiatives addressed the demand for military
housing during the Cold War. Wherry and
Capehart were senators who caused a bunch
of housing to be built on military installations
and we lived in an apartment on post until a
few months after I got off active duty. They
allowed civilians to live there too. Our first
child, our son, was born while we were living
on post.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of music did you
play with your band?
Pete Reid: Contemporary dance music. I
played saxophone and clarinet.
Mike Garrambone: When did you get out of
the service?
Pete Reid: May 1958.
Bill Dunn: Did BRL ask you to stay?
Pete Reid: It was hard to find an avail-
able position at the time. They offered me
a job doing what I was already doing as an ord-
nance engineer, so they originally called me
an ordnance engineer. Then they abolished
that job category and I took an all-day test
to qualify as a mechanical engineer. I passed
that and very soon after I became a mechanical
engineer.
Bill Dunn: What grade level was that when
you started?
Pete Reid: I started as a GS-9. They gave me
credit for the time I had worked there on active
duty, so I got a good position when I started.
Mike Garrambone: Were you still in the Spe-
cial Weapons Evaluation Branch?
Pete Reid: Yes, that’s true. I was a mechanical
engineer from GS-9 through GS-13. I made GS-
13 in 1963.
Bill Dunn: You moved up basically a grade
a year?
Pete Reid: Yes, I was promoted pretty rap-
idly. Then I was named the Chief of the War
Games Branch and I had that job through 1968
at the GS-14 and 15 levels.
Bill Dunn: When you switched over from
enlisted to civilian, were you doing the same
jobs?
Pete Reid: Exactly the same jobs, things that I
created really.
Mike Garrambone: What was going on in the
world there in 1958? Were there wars going on
and were there people looking at weapons sys-
tems?
Pete Reid: We had a lot of stuff going on in
Quemoy and Matsu. They are little islands off
the coast of Formosa, now Taiwan, which the
Chinese mainland field artillery was hitting ev-
ery day. We were asked things like what kind of
weapons are needed to counter their daily bom-
bardment. The inhabitants actually offered to
swim over there and make measurements on
the mainland of the Chinese artillery positions.
I don’t know that they ever actually did that.
Then of course you had conflicts going on ev-
erywhere. We had troops put ashore in Lebanon
during the time I was on active duty. We worked
constantly on what was perceived as the Soviet
Union threat to Western Europe.
Bill Dunn: Did BRL send any civilian ana-
lysts or data collection people forward?
Pete Reid: I’m not aware of BRL sending any-
body until 1966. Some of my people went over
to Israel and did some experiments with cap-
tured Soviet equipment and with Israeli equip-
ment, most of which had been furnished by
us. Then I led teams that went over there in sev-
eral subsequent deployments following the
Yom Kippur War and their 1978 incursion into
Lebanon. Some more stuff was captured. I know
that the BRL had people over there from 1966 on
and I don’t recall that anyone was deployed in
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conflict areas, except Vietnam. We had people in
Vietnam collecting both materiel damage data
and soldier wound data. I was not part of that.
Bill Dunn: Did you do any Vietnam analysis
at BRL?
Pete Reid: I was still working in field artillery
and wargaming, and one of the big tasks that we
had during that time was the Red Leg (later
called Legal Mix) study. This was a new study
that happened every five years or so to deter-
mine the best choice of field artillery weapons,
cannon, missiles, etc. One of the scenarios that
we chose to develop had to do with the Ia Drang
battle that Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore’s bat-
talion became involved in. We had a whole
bunch of guys from Fort Sill come to Aberdeen
and work in our wargaming rooms.
We had a good facility for wargaming with
special panels for mounting maps, but we
did not have really good maps in that area of
Vietnam. We had a little bit of the Ia Drang Val-
ley itself that we wanted to study, but we didn’t
have the surrounding terrain very well. We ac-
tually moved what we referred to as a potato
shaped section of Ia Drang Valley and put it in
another part of Vietnam and built a scenario
around that for evaluating contributions of field
artillery. We also had deployments and scenar-
ios written for higher aggregations of conflict
in central Europe.
We had several scenarios that we evaluated
as part of the Red Leg studies. It turned out that
Red Leg was an Air Force code word, so we were
required to change the name. Fort Sill changed
the name to the Legal Mix X studies where ‘‘X’’
denotes the number of the study they were work-
ing at the time, i.e., Legal Mix 1, Legal Mix 2, etc.
Because I had come up in the field artillery sup-
port weapons side of BRL, I was involved in all of
those as time went on.
Mike Garrambone: Could you describe for us
what you mean when you say wargaming? Is it
more of a map exercise or a simulation or guys
working at the table?
Pete Reid: Early on it was more of a map ex-
ercise. Later on it became both a map exercise
and simulation. I’ll talk more about simulation
later.
Bill Dunn: Were there many military in the
leadership positions at BRL when you were
there?
Pete Reid: The commander of BRL was
a colonel for years, and after I came on as a ci-
vilian I wrote recommendations for military
positions pointing out that we needed people
with combat experience working on the prob-
lems we had. We got four majors and one lieu-
tenant colonel on my staff that assembled not
too many years after I took my first civilian
job there, and then we became the Weapons
Systems Laboratory. The BRL also had a civilian
Technical Director.
Mike Garrambone: Were you there for the
transition from BRL to the establishment of the
Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency?
Pete Reid: Yes.
Mike Garrambone: How did that take place?
Did you change jobs and titles during that?
Pete Reid: I changed titles. I didn’t change
jobs. I changed from Chief of the War Games
Branch and Weapons Systems Laboratory of
BRL to Chief of the Tactical Operations Analysis
office of AMSAA in 1968.
Bill Dunn: Why was AMSAA set up?
Pete Reid: Fundamentally, General Bunker,
the deputy at Army Materiel Command (AMC)
headquarters, wanted a systems analysis capa-
bility reporting directly to him and responsive
to him. The original thought had been to have
one group at Aberdeen, one group at Fort Mon-
mouth, and one group at Rock Island and/or
Warren, Michigan. I wasn’t part of the politics
part, but as I understand it the folks at Fort
Monmouth and Rock Island turned in enor-
mous requirements for staffing and funding
that General Bunker balked at, so he said,
‘‘Let’s do it all at Aberdeen.’’ He caused
a bunch of spaces to be transferred from BRL
to set it up and there was some more in-fighting
within the BRL as to who was going to be run-
ning it. In stepped the Chief Scientist at AMC
and he said, ‘‘It shall be Dr. Joe Sperrazza.’’
Once that was settled there was another hic-
cup having to do with a proposed Aberdeen Re-
search and Development Center (RDEC) and
they were offering Joe the job of running it. It
would have included the Weapons Systems
Laboratory and Human Engineering Labora-
tory and a couple of other parts. Joe said no,
he wanted to run AMSAA. But there was even-
tually an Aberdeen RDEC set up and AMSAA
became a part of it for a very brief while. Except
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for that, we reported directly to the AMC com-
mander starting in 1968.
Bill Dunn: Did all of the Weapons Systems
Laboratory move to become AMSAA? And
did everyone move or was it voluntary?
Pete Reid: Nobody changed a desk. The only
difference was there wasn’t anything voluntary
about it. There was some competition for some
of our staff with the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) in Atlantic City. The national
association having to do with the FAA was ad-
vertising in our area and they attracted some
of our bright people who went up there, one
of whom (Don Scheffler) I worked with very
closely in BRL and I still correspond with him
almost every day. He became the inventor of
the Easy Sabre air reservation system. Easy
Sabre was the grandfather of all of the commer-
cial aviation reservation systems, so when you
book your ticket you’re going through the
granddaughter of Don Scheffler’s invention.
Mike Garrambone: We were talking about
some of the transitions.
Pete Reid: The only thing that was different
was the people who were in the Weapons Sys-
tems Laboratory who were working strictly on
vulnerability were transferred over to the Ter-
minal Ballistics Laboratory of BRL, so we did
lose some very knowledgeable people there.
Bill Dunn: Dr. Sperrazza was the first direc-
tor. Was there some discussion about whether it
should be led by a civilian or a military?
Pete Reid: Not to my knowledge.
Mike Garrambone: How big of an organiza-
tion was it at the time?
Pete Reid: The initial strength was about 130.
Mike Garrambone: That’s a sizable organiza-
tion, a lot of brainpower.
Pete Reid: Yes. Maximum strength was about
430–440.
Bill Dunn: How many of those were military?
Pete Reid: Remember the Limited Warfare
Laboratory (LWL)? That organization became
part of AMSAA when they broke up the LWL,
and they had a lot of enlisted men, I mean
a lot compared to what we’d normally have.
They probably had 10 or 15 enlisted men. I think
at one time we had seven colonels. Now we’re
lucky to get one. In fact the only active duty per-
son we have is our deputy director today at
AMSAA, only the one. The most military we
ever had in the organization surely didn’t ex-
ceed 30–35.
Bill Dunn: How did you grow your civilian
analysts?
Pete Reid: A lot of greening programs. We
would send them to places like Fort Benning
and arranged for them to drive armored person-
nel carriers and fire infantry weapons. They
would go to Fort Knox and they were allowed
to fire tank main guns and machine guns. We
would send them to Fort Sill where they were
allowed to take part in firing battery training.
We set up our own courses for wearing protec-
tive masks right outside the area where we
had our offices in Aberdeen. People wear pro-
tective masks for long periods of time and per-
form various tasks. We had them take some of
the courses that are offered.
I took courses at Fort Huachuca, Arizona—
sensor management and that sort of thing. We
sent people all over to take courses. We had
a wonderful ordnance museum in Aberdeen. I
took young employees to the museum many
times and I had them watch tapes of combat.
They had a wonderful library of tape from
WW II. The only problem is we see the huge dif-
ference in tapes from WW II compared to tapes
from Korea or Vietnam. You can see the prog-
ress of development of the telephoto lens, so
when the cameraman is being subjected to op-
posing fire, with the advent of the telephoto
lens the camera stays on the action a lot longer
than it did in WW II. As soon as there were any
weapons firing in the area, the camera went
down in the foxhole with everybody else. So
you got to see more of the action, especially
from Vietnam.
The museum at Aberdeen is one of the
things I’m afraid they’re going to move down
with the Ordnance School. Believe me, the rest
of us used those facilities a lot more than the
Ordnance School ever dreamed of using it, but
it’s their argument that they need to have access
to it. It used to be a wonderful resource for in-
dustry also. They would come in and see how
things were done, and they were always inter-
ested in the way the Germans built their auto-
motive and weapons systems.
They had a great display. We got a pretty
good guy in there running it. The original cura-
tor, Mr. Jarrett, had collected most of the stuff
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himself on the battlefield. In fact he kept part of
the collection on his farm about 15 miles away
when he ran out of space at Aberdeen. That’s
a great resource for greening as are all of the var-
ious Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) schools around the country.
Bill Dunn: Did you have a co-op program to
attract analysts?
Pete Reid: We did. We had a lot of students
come from as far away as Nevada during the
summer. Most of you know Warren Olsen and
his brother Al. Warren Olsen is a South Dakota
kid and came to work for me from his school
in Minnesota. Mainly of course they were from
the local area, from Pennsylvania, Maryland,
some from Virginia, but we always had jobs
for bright kids to come work in the summer.
Mike Garrambone: Tell us about your early
work with modeling and simulation.
Pete Reid: My group built the first division-
level combat simulation that we had, really em-
phasizing the weapons performance attributes
that you want to be able to study.
Mike Garrambone: When did that occur?
Pete Reid: That would’ve been in the vicinity
of 1969 or 1970 and the actual development
went on for a couple of years.
Bill Dunn: What was the name of that
simulation?
Pete Reid: Division Level (DIVLEV) simu-
lation.
Mike Garrambone: Was it an in-house
development?
Pete Reid: Yes. Morgan Smith came to me
and said he had talked to Dr. Sperrazza who
had agreed that I could choose people from
the staff across AMSAA that I wanted to work
on developing it. Basically I got my way and I
was given the people I asked for. They were
people who knew how to conceptualize things
and represent physical processes with mathe-
matical formulas and do it in an understand-
able way and develop techniques in ways
such that people could come on board and
could understand them. That was very impor-
tant for the soldiers who took part later to be
able to easily understand what it was we were
emulating, and how.
We built it and Dr. Sperrazza, the senior
staff, and all the division chiefs in AMSAA
came in for seven consecutive Saturdays and
reviewed all of that stuff in great detail. I mean
all of that stuff, every assumption, everything
that we did. About three to four hours for seven
consecutive Saturdays. They were not reim-
bursed for any of that. They just came in and
did it and made some good comments and
we’d go back and do rework.
Mike Garrambone: You had your own com-
puter department and code guys to work this
all together?
Pete Reid: I’m a great believer in having the
analysts also doing the coding so that they un-
derstand cause and effect very well.
Mike Garrambone: That’s outstanding!
Pete Reid: It was then. I can’t do it anymore,
but that’s what I had. I had the people who de-
veloped the methodology do the coding. We did
not ask for, and never got, any help in coding.
Mike Garrambone: It sounds like you had ev-
ery piece of the game that you needed to do this.
It’s hard to get all those together at one place.
Pete Reid: Yes it is, very hard.
Mike Garrambone: You had either fantastic
supporters or mentors or something.
Pete Reid: I did and we also had staff stabil-
ity. Unlike most other organizations, AMSAA
always had very low turnover. I enjoyed hav-
ing the people who did the building blocks of
how things were going to be represented and
emulated—all the physical processes. I had them
for years.
Bill Dunn: How long did the runs take?
Pete Reid: We could keep up in real time. We
always had to have orders sent out to company
and battery level, sometimes even finer than
that. As soon as they sent them, within a couple
hours we would get them back. The biggest
problem was the computer was over in a differ-
ent building; we would run over there—it was
half a block away.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us about those teams that
you deployed with to Israel. How many guys
were on the team, their skills, and what kinds
of stuff you did?
Pete Reid: I had people who did vulnerabil-
ity work and a couple of retired armor officers.
Following the 1973 War, we went into the Golan
where there were literally hundreds of British,
French, and Russian combat vehicles litter-
ing the battlefield despite the best efforts of
the Israelis to police them up and take them into
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depots to take them apart. We got there while
the vehicles were still out there and we were
able to visit hundreds of combat vehicles right
where they had been killed, and in many cases
determine the shot that killed them. We had to
identify what kind of weapon it was, which
was fairly easy; we measured the angle of at-
tack and we noted internal damage. We di-
vided into teams including one former armor
officer and one civilian, so I was on a team that
had one of each. We made all those measure-
ments and in the evening we would go back
to the Kibbutz where we stayed. We would
summarize all our work and get it down to
the embassy for shipment back to the United
States.
Bob Sheldon: Did you compare the data you
collected from combat vehicles there to your re-
sults from the test range?
Pete Reid: That was the objective. If Mike
Garrambone were to go over to the archives on
Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio,
there is an organization there, the Survivability/
Vulnerability Information Analysis Center
(SURVIAC), that has kept the records with all
the photographs and all the measurements we
made from the 1973 War—hundreds and hun-
dreds of tanks and many other combat vehicles.
They have either my original photographs and
forms or a good copy of all of them.
Mike Garrambone: It sounds like you had
more irons in the fire there besides getting
your own data. Were you into battle damage
assessment?
Pete Reid: Absolutely.
Mike Garrambone: You could call it exploita-
tion. You could call it design or redesign. Were
you doing all those kind of things with that in-
formation you were gathering?
Pete Reid: The battle damage repair came
along a little bit later and that was more an ini-
tiative of Joe Sperrazza and John Kramar that
certainly took advantage of all of our data and
measurements. The Israelis became tremendous
at field repairs. Some of our maintenance people
just shake their head at the speed at which the
Israelis could exchange a tank transmission in
the field. The Self Propelled (SP) 175 mm gun
and the SP 8-inch Howitzer had a common chas-
sis. They changed from one caliber to the other
in the field at blinding speed when they began
running short of ammunition in one area and
still needed the cannon.
The Israelis became extremely good at
combat expedients, battle damage repair, etc.,
and you’d see them recycle their tanks, plug
holes, and get them back in the line. Peo-
ple, in general, think that the tube-launched,
optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank
rocket system we had, was used in the conflict.
It wasn’t. It was used during the war of attri-
tion that occurred after the conflict and I had
access to all those records. They had a phenom-
enal hit rate with 32 TOW missiles that they
fired after the formal part of the 1973 War was
over.
There was still a lot of action going on and
it was going on even while those of us who
were collecting battlefield damage were up
there. There were daily exchanges of artillery
and other things going on. They would some-
times move us around depending on their an-
ticipation that certain areas were going to be
hit, and they were very good at that.
Mike Garrambone: It seems like you would
also have an opportunity there to look at perfor-
mance of the weapons that caused the damage.
Were you collecting data that was useful for
that?
Pete Reid: Everything that we recorded
reflected on the performance of weapons sys-
tems. It was not just target vulnerability. It was
also the performance of the weapons that hit
them.
Bill Dunn: As a civilian, were you getting
hazardous duty pay over there?
Pete Reid: Not only was I not getting hazard-
ous duty pay, but the per diem rate for a civilian
was way less than it was for a soldier. The mili-
tary guys, the active duty guys on my team,
were getting three or four times as much per
diem as I was. I couldn’t even pay my hotel bill
when I was living in Tel Aviv with the per diem I
got. [Laughs] I should’ve gone in and asked for
an adjustment of some kind, but I didn’t do it.
I think I got $25 a day and the hotel bill was
$27 a day, which included breakfast.
Bill Dunn: Did you have to sign away your
rights for insurance when you were in a war
zone?
Pete Reid: I don’t remember it ever coming
up. It was just a case of going over and doing
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what seemed like the right thing to do. I have no
recollection of insurance issues.
Bill Dunn: Were you involved in 73 Easting?
It was the armor battle during the Gulf War (1991)
between primarily the Army 2nd Armored
Cavalry Regiment and the Iraqi Republican
Guards Tawakalna Tank Division who were in
prepared positions at 73 Easting. It was named
for a Universal Transverse Mercator north-
south coordinate line (an ‘‘Easting’’), measured
in kilometers and readable on Global Position-
ing System (GPS) receivers. After the battle,
COL Mike Krause from Army Center of Military
History went over there and surveyed every lo-
cation, every hull, every shot azimuth, every
battle damage assessment, and ‘‘reconstructed’’
the Battle of 73 Easting. COL Don Holder, who
later retired as a Lieutenant General, was the
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) com-
mander. CPT H. R. McMaster, currently Major
General (2012), was the troop commander. It
sounds like the kind of work AMSAA might
have been involved with.
Pete Reid: We didn’t have anything to do
with it. No one asked for us.
Bill Dunn: Any other work with the Israelis?
Pete Reid: In 1976 I convinced the Israelis
to let us have some historical data to use in
checking out our wargame methodology. They
wanted to know what the wargame method-
ology was, and I went over there to brief them.
Every corps commander, the armor corps and
the artillery corps, came and sat in on day after
day of greatly detailed briefings. The US Army
liaison officer at the embassy kept coming to
me and saying, ‘‘These guys don’t want to hear
all this.’’ I said, ‘‘Look, this is what they asked
for.’’
Some of the highest ranked guys in the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) sat there for hours
and listened to my guys briefing our methodol-
ogy. It paid off because they put a six-month ef-
fort together with their chief historian, several
combat arms officers, and one really competent
OR guy named Dr. Adam Shefi, a PhD in sys-
tems analysis from Stanford. One of the people
who came over and helped in the subsequent
wargame that used their historical input was
Ehud Barak. He not only became the IDF senior
commander but also the Prime Minister of Is-
rael for a while and is still in competition for
it every time they vote for a new prime minis-
ter. He had been a tank battalion commander
under General Adan during the 1973 War and
had gone into El Arish without any artillery
support and got waxed. In fact General Adan
himself came up and spent a day with us while
we were doing that reconstruction. When we
have had an opportunity to explain our meth-
odology, we have had the attention of some
pretty good people.
Bill Dunn: How was the validation of your
simulation results compared to what the Israelis
had actually seen on the battlefield?
Pete Reid: We were able to reconstruct some
of the battles primarily from the Golan region
and produce the same casualty rates (as a func-
tion of time) as had occurred in the real battles.
It was amazing. I was so pleased, and it all
hinged on our ability to represent the effects of
suppressing fire; the effects of suppression re-
ally paced the battle and we were able to do that.
One more thing about the Israelis: When we
came back from the 1978 review of the Israeli in-
cursion into Lebanon, my team wrote up the
weapons performance report and of course the
guys at TRADOC wrote up the remaining stuff.
General Max Thurman, then the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army (VCSA), said he didn’t want
to publish it the way it was written, so he turned
to the Army War College to have it recast. They
put our weapons performance stuff in as it
had been written. That became part of the final
report.
One of the things that General Thurman
objected to was that the Israelis used a lot of
their propaganda language in characterizing
that conflict, and the US team used the same lan-
guage. You might be interested to know that the
three Israeli brigade commanders who led the
three task forces into Lebanon in that conflict
were all at Harvard University the day before
they led off the battle. They flew to Israel and
off they went with their brigades into the Bekaa
Valley, and to the east and west.
But there was a massive Israeli propaganda
effort. If you can remember they sent some se-
nior people over here to be interviewed on tele-
vision and so on. I know Nati Sharoni, once the
chief of the artillery corps, was one of them.
‘‘We’re just going to go so far. We’re not going
to go all the way into Beirut,’’ this and that
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and the other thing, and I guess you remember
how that actually turned out. So they were still
on their propaganda bit when the team went
over to interview them and collect information
without their support. We didn’t get nearly the
access to the materiel damage in that instance
as we had in previous conflicts. In my opinion,
our financial support and foreign military sales
should provide for efficient access to perfor-
mance in combat. Our Department of State has
objected to such an arrangement. We somehow
find ways to allow the politicians to influence
that.
Mike Garrambone: You took on studies for
other folks like TRADOC Analysis Center
(TRAC). Who else?
Pete Reid: I’ll mention two main ones that
we did for Wilbur when TRADOC did not have
a division-level wargame capability. One of
them was a second echelon interdiction study,
and another was a counter-battery study, and
we did both of those in concert with the Ger-
man army.
Mike Garrambone: Who was at TRAC at the
time?
Pete Reid: Wilbur Payne was there. Wilbur
was the Director and Aquim Pavel was his
German counterpart, Colonel Pavel. We had
in-process reviews every couple of months
and they both sat in on every single one of
them.
Mike Garrambone: Did you ever get tasks
from AMC headquarters?
Pete Reid: Yes, especially when they set
up a battlefield systems integration director.
One main job that I did for them was look at
the role of TOW in a brigade scenario and
we used DIVLEV for that. Major General Ira
Hunt was the director of that element of
AMC headquarters.
Mike Garrambone: What about the Depart-
ment of Army (DA) staff? Did they tap you for
anything?
Pete Reid: They did constantly. When
Dr. Payne was on the Army staff he was con-
stantly asking us to do this and that. Even the
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff did
when Leonard Sullivan was there and General
Bonesteel. They gave birth to the F-4C versus
Lance study on contributions to land warfare.
They came up and actually spent hours poring
over the maps and overlays that we created.
I’m a great believer in highly visible means of
conveying information and there’s no better
way to illustrate what you’re doing in a war-
game than having those map overlays and show-
ing people exactly what assumptions were made
and how you carried out the scenario.
We also did a study that was initiated by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the DA staff to look at the roles of things like the
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Greg
Ogden was on the DA staff and asked me to take
on this study along with NATO countries.
Around 1980, General Jim Drummond
came to run AMSAA for a while in between ci-
vilian directors. He had been the chairman of
the Combat Developments Department at Fort
Sill when this study requirement first came up
and he told DA that his on-going workload
was such that he could not work on it. When
he came to AMSAA he found out that I was in
the middle of working on it, so that was fun.
We set up a scenario. The Germans set up
a larger unit scenario at their facility within
the Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft mbH
(IABG), Ottobrunn, Germany, south of Munich.
In any case, we were on the telephone with them
daily so that we could keep the progress of the
two simulations going apace, and the German
Army sent several officers to Aberdeen to par-
ticipate directly.
We had a German colonel and two or three
captains from his staff working in our game
room. I had set up this really nice office with
a very nice desk for the German colonel across
the hall. I worked on cleaning it myself and he
had a secretary and all the accoutrements. But
he insisted on being in the game room the whole
time he was there. It turned out the guy was
a huge help in the game. We had combat arms
officers from every NATO country, including
Denmark and Canada. We ran that game and
it turned out to be a great way to illustrate the
counter-artillery capability of the MLRS system,
and it helped the United States to sell many
NATO countries on buying that system. It was
a good job to work on.
Mike Garrambone: DIVLEV was doing that?
Pete Reid: Yes.
Bill Dunn: So you were Chief of the Tactical
Operations Analysis (TOA) office up until when?
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Pete Reid: Until 1982. Then I was promoted
to the Senior Executive Service (SES) and Chief
of the Combat Support Division, but the TOA
office remained a part of that division.
Bill Dunn: What things did your new divi-
sion do?
Pete Reid: That had been Keith Myer’s
job, Combat Support Division, and we added
some things. I had the responsibility for all
the communications, electronics, survivability,
chemical-biological, automotive mobility, plus
tactical operations.
Bill Dunn: Keith Myers moved up to be the
Director of AMSAA.
Pete Reid: Right. When he became Director I
took his division, combined with my former
TOA Office.
Bill Dunn: It sounds like there were some
different things in there that you hadn’t neces-
sarily done before.
Pete Reid: I had experience with respect to
the sensors. I had worked on target acquisition
systems almost my whole career.
Bill Dunn: And the chemical part?
Pete Reid: I had done some work on chemi-
cal in a ‘‘What if?’’ study. What if the Soviets
opened up conflict with a bunch of wide area
chemical weapons in a land battle in Europe,
how well were we prepared? You can well
imagine what the answer to that was. I had done
that part of the work. I wasn’t unfamiliar with
chemical, but the chemical that came with the
division was also wrapped up in the survivabil-
ity branch that was moved into the division.
Keith didn’t have that survivability branch.
That was moved in when we restructured after
he became director.
Bill Dunn: And you kept the wargaming
part?
Pete Reid: I kept the wargaming and merged
that with command and control. I thought the
answer to some of the command and control
materiel issues would be solved through the un-
derstandings developed during wargaming. I
would have to say that has not come to fruition
to this day. I think when Charlie Todd was in
TRAC, he was doing some experiments at Fort
Hood that supported some of the modeling of
command and control processes that probably
has come closer to what needed to be done there
than anything else I’ve seen. It’s unfortunate
that Charlie left TRAC like he did, and nobody
really picked it up very well.
Mike Garrambone: When I met you, you
were looking at other people’s models and I
was using the Corps Battle Analyzer (CORBAN)
simulation. You guys gave me a technical assess-
ment of models, including verification, valida-
tion, and accreditation (VV&A). Was that part
of your business or you were just being a nice
guy?
Pete Reid: For many years Walt Hollis fre-
quently asked me to review TRADOC model
development because he controlled some of
the purse strings in funding their model de-
velopment work. A couple of times a year I
would go in and brief him on my recommen-
dations for funding. He always accepted my
recommendations.
Mike Garrambone: You were a member of the
Army Model and Simulation Executive Council
(AMSEC)?
Pete Reid:Not a member. The main role I had
was advising Walt on what he ought to fund. He
had several million bucks under the Army
Model Improvement Program that he could
send out to TRADOC and other agencies for this
and that model development and they would
always come in with requests for more than he
had, so he’d ask me for advice on where to send
the money. I had a small team with two guys
from AMSAA, Erwin Atzinger and Tom Nolan,
and whoever we could get from TRAC. We
would go listen to the Engineer School and/or
the people from Waterways Experiment Station
who always had good ideas. Every TRADOC
center submitted proposals for simulation devel-
opment. TRADOC was always very cooperative
in providing details, and we always included
TRADOC analysts in the reviews.
We would go listen to their proposals. We
would have meetings at some central location,
although I found the Waterways facility to be
central more often than it should have been.
They just did a great job of hosting us down
there and I liked their catfish. I would go do that
about three times a year and I would have occa-
sion to brief Mr. Hollis on it two or three times
a year and then he would make his decisions
on what to fund. So I think probably my knowl-
edge of CORBAN probably came from doing
some of that.
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Mike Garrambone: It seems like you were
working on developing better capabilities in
all the models.
Pete Reid: Better understanding of the repli-
cation of the physical processes. Constantly
trying to have things more readily understood
when we were trying to emulate. Make sure the
analysts are able to interpret simulation results
in light of the inputs.
Bill Dunn: I remember one in particular that
Mr. Hollis had asked you to do, to look at theater-
level simulations.
Pete Reid: True. I think he was stimulated by
the fact that he found that the Intelligence com-
munity had spent millions of dollars having
contractors develop models that nobody can
understand. I soon found out why he felt that
way. I think they spent $15 million on that one
simulation. He had me go look at that and I de-
cided that they had really done nothing of
value. $15 million was a heck of a lot of money
for model development back then. Probably
a drop in the bucket today; but boy, it was
a lot of money.
Mike Garrambone: Were you in charge of the
joint munitions organization and also publish-
ing information on algorithms?
Pete Reid: No. I was not in charge of the Joint
Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs). The
Director of AMSAA is the chairman of the Joint
Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions
Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) and produced the or-
ange manuals. I have never worked in that
group. I have supported that group in various
and sundry ways but I haven’t been a part of it.
Mike Garrambone: I got the impression that
the algorithms and the data might have fallen
in your bailiwick.
Pete Reid: No, not in my bailiwick. I’m inter-
ested in them and I actually had a contract since
I retired to write up some of those model de-
scriptions for them, and I think they’re available
online. I was mainly a technical editor in that
role. I went out, got the model developers to
write up their descriptions, and then I tried to
make them more understandable.
Mike Garrambone: When did you get to your
first MORS Symposium (MORSS)?
Pete Reid: It would have been in San Diego. I
went to it because of the colonel running BRL at
the time. Charlie Ostrom wanted me to write
a paper for him to deliver based on experience
he had in Korea as an ordnance officer. I devel-
oped a paper for him to give, but at the last min-
ute he decided he couldn’t go. He wanted me to
go and give the paper. I think it was after Dave
Hardison left the BRL, so it was probably about
1963. At that time the symposia were run by the
Navy pretty much exclusively. I went to it and I
gave that paper, but I didn’t find it to be a very
interesting bunch to tell you the truth.
Mike Garrambone: You started presenting
more papers thereafter.
Pete Reid: Maybe two or three times. I re-
member going with Morgan Smith to a MORSS
up in Rhode Island at a Navy installation. I
haven’t been to very many MORSS. You got
me into one MORSS out at Fort Leavenworth.
Mike Garrambone: That was a very interest-
ing heritage session. I’m really glad you came.
Pete Reid: AMSAA became 40 years old last
October and I have been working on trying
to write a history of the organization that came
before AMSAA in 1968. Some guys within
AMSAA have been trying to write what went
on during the last 40 years.
Bill Dunn: Did you go to any other socie-
ties like the Operations Research Society of
America?
Pete Reid: I almost never missed an Army
Operations Research Symposium (AORS) at
Fort Lee, Virginia. Back when I first started go-
ing to AORS, there were working groups. You
would have a general session and then you
would split off in working groups for about
a day-and-a-half, and then the working groups
would come back and report to the general
session. In more recent years Walt Hollis
changed that and dropped one day of the meet-
ing for reasons of economy, so you don’t have
this interaction.
You get a lot of young people in those work-
ing groups giving papers and you have a chair-
man who is going to put the thing together in
a common theme. It’s a useful thing to have
the synthesis presented back to the general ses-
sion, but we don’t have that anymore. If I were
running things I would somehow recreate that
even at the cost of not having it for as long as
it used to be. I chaired AORS working groups
probably 15 times and took part in every aspect
of AORS meetings at one time or another. I did
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papers for the general sessions. I would always
give a paper in my working group and so on.
Mike Garrambone: One of the things that
you’re emphasizing was getting your own data.
What are your thoughts on that?
Pete Reid: I think that’s the way to under-
stand it. Keith Myers spent a lot of the earlier
part of his career out in the field doing arena
tests, firing artillery shells inside a ring of wit-
ness boards and then counting fragment strikes
in those witness boards. He also spent a lot of
time looking at the effects of the environment
(examples would be twigs, grass, snow, etc.)
on bullets and fragments en route to a target. I as-
sembled a team to measure terrain microstruc-
ture so that the effects on small fragments
could be determined. Then there are the oppor-
tunities you have to collect wound data. We
have, I think, more than 7,000 cases of soldier
wounds that were collected in Vietnam and in
a few other places. Then you’ve got the battle
damage to materiel that most of us have partici-
pated in at one place or another. I think it’s in-
valuable to your own understanding of how
your job ought to be carried out as an analyst.
Get your hands on the stuff, hands on the actual
performance of the systems.
Mike Garrambone: The other thing that goes
with that is you had a lot of resources at
AMSAA. Tell us how you felt about having
the ability to talk to folks.
Pete Reid: Access to the firing tables and
vulnerability people in BRL and people at the
Ordnance School for maintenance issues is ex-
tremely important. I think it is often overlooked
by people who are trying to make decisions
about what pegs ought to go in what holes
around the Army. It’s invaluable to have right-
next-door access to people who are working
daily doing engineering and other work that
supports the Army’s betterment. The museum
was a valuable asset, especially for greening.
We used to have the Foreign Science and
Technology Center (FSTC) at Aberdeen. Then
it was moved to Washington and now down to
Charlottesville, Virginia. I would still go down
to Charlottesville, right up until the time I re-
tired, to share information with them. It was
much easier to get information from them when
they were located at APG. It made the whole job
a lot easier.
APG has a very unique ability to land the C-5
aircraft with whatever foreign materiel has been
collected wherever in the world. There aren’t
very many places where that can be done and
they still have a little branch of the FSTC organi-
zation there. All the equipment that was cap-
tured in Grenada came into APG, for example,
and there was some very interesting stuff there,
and equipment comes out of the Middle East
into there all the time. You can go out and kick
the tracks and climb up on top and look through
the sights and so on and so forth, look at where
the weapons strikes have been if it had been
damaged in combat. It’s very helpful to be able
to do it right there where you’re working.
Bill Dunn: Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) is going to put some more agencies,
e.g., the Communications and Electronics Com-
mand (CECOM), into APG.
Pete Reid: Yes, we will get communications
and electronics.
Bill Dunn: So that may even further enhance
what you’re talking about.
Pete Reid: I think it will help, yes.
Mike Garrambone: Do you think it would be
a good idea to put more military billets at APG?
Pete Reid: Absolutely. I mentioned that we
only have one active duty guy. Dr. Crain is a re-
tired Army infantry officer by the way.
Mike Garrambone: It sounds like you want
one of every branch.
Pete Reid: That would be good. We used to
have that; certainly every kind of combat arms.
We also had people from transportation. Gosh,
we had one colonel of transportation. Matter
of fact we’ve had a couple of them. Obviously
we’ve had ordnance people, but right now
(2009) we have only one active duty military
at AMSAA.
Mike Garrambone: Do you have liaisons from
the schools or from TRAC?
Pete Reid: No. There are liaisons on post but
not within AMSAA.
Mike Garrambone: What about liaisons from
the allied officers?
Pete Reid: No, not at AMSAA. We have had
foreign exchange analysts at AMSAA and we’ve
sent people. I had an officer in my office from
Israel for two years. We’ve had Australians
from six months to one-year assignments. We’ve
had people from England for usually two-year
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assignments. We’ve had people from South
Korea for six-month to one-year assignments,
and we’ve sent people to all those places.
We had a lot of distinguished visitors. I re-
member a Major Garrambone. He would come
to see me and I always enjoyed his visits.
Mike Garrambone: Just an aside here, as I re-
call you saw your name on one of my slides at
the meeting as being a co-conspirator.
Pete Reid: You were always very good at giv-
ing credit when not that much credit was due.
Mike Garrambone: It was by association.
Pete Reid: You made one trip around the
country, Mike, and you had about 40 names
on your charts.
Mike Garrambone: That’s true. They always
ask you, ‘‘Has so-and-so seen this?’’ so I thought
I’d cut it off early and say, ‘‘These are the guys
that have seen it.’’
Pete Reid: Right. You did a very thorough job
of that.
Mike Garrambone: What would you tell new
guys trying to come down the road?
Pete Reid: Well basically when I’ve had
the opportunity to do that, I’ve given them ex-
amples of the kinds of things they’d get an op-
portunity to work on. At a place like AMSAA
you get a chance to influence just about every
Army program and some programs in the other
services.
Mike Garrambone: Anything that they espe-
cially need to do to prepare?
Pete Reid: Go get a good degree in physics.
That’s what I go for mainly, people with degrees
in physics. Engineering degrees, math degrees,
physics. Those are the areas I’m interested in
terms of college preparation. The rest of it you
sort of learn on the job. I had great mentors.
Roger Willis, I mentioned before, was just tre-
mendous. I used to have conversations with
Dave Hardison almost every Saturday. I had fre-
quent conversations with Wilbur Payne. I had
frequent conversations with Walt Hollis. I was
lucky enough to meet Walt Hollis while I was
still fairly young, and it was a good idea to
pay attention to what he said. Walt was in the
fire control business at Frankford Arsenal when
I first met him. My Weapons Systems Labora-
tory chief, Morgan Smith, told Walt to come
see me after General Bunker had told Walt that
he wanted an analysis of the eye hazard from
laser range finders in night sensors and range
finders that Walt was proposing to develop.
So Walt came to see me, and we did a back
of the envelope look at what the hazards were
to the soldier’s eye when those things were
deployed on the battlefield. We went to brief
General Bunker who said, ‘‘Fine, but I want a
more comprehensive study. Back of the enve-
lope isn’t good enough.’’ He said, ‘‘I can envi-
sion being called in before the Congress
sometime in the future and being accused of
destroying the vision of thousands of soldiers.
I want to know if that’s really likely to happen.’’
So that led to him directing all of the project
managers to send money to me to do a greatly
detailed study of the risk of eye damage due
to the employment of lasers on the battlefield,
not laser weapons, a coincidental laser thing.
We evaluated about 20 different systems,
mainly night vision devices and range finders
ultimately to the cost of millions of dollars.
We’d take each one and brief it usually to Gen-
eral Bunker, and he would then approve the
fielding of the system. We showed him that
the probability that a soldier would get laser en-
ergy into his eye in a specific scenario was
maybe 0.00000001, i.e., the probability that he
was threatened by a reflection off some drop
of moisture on a leaf. Then General Bunker
was happier. That was all started in conversa-
tions between Walt Hollis and General Bunker.
Then when Walt moved on to Monterey to
the Combat Developments Experimentation
Center (CDEC), I had many occasions to go visit
him because I was always interested in the work
that was being done out there. When General
Elmer Ochs, who was Walt’s boss, became the
first director of the Operational Test and Evalu-
ation Agency, OTEA, he asked Walt to come to
OTEA too. Walt frequently would call me and
want me to come down to Northern Virginia
or he would come up and discuss problems. I
did that and then later on when there was a va-
cancy at OTEA, Walt asked me to be the technical
director there until they hired a permanent per-
son. I did that. Often when they renewed the
CDEC contract they would call on me to be part
of the contract team to come in and review all
the contract proposals and make a recommenda-
tion as to who should be hired. So I went out to
Sacramento. They usually had it at the depot
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in Sacramento. I’d spend a couple of weeks
there every couple of years. I was on that team
along with Marion Bryson and Walt and one
or two of his colonels from CDEC reviewing
those contract proposals, so I did a lot of that. I
was in the Review of Army Analysis Extended.
Walt and E. B. Vandiver ran that study. I wrote
two of the chapters of that report. Lieutenant
Colonel Dave Maddox, later General Maddox,
was also a member of that review.
Bill Dunn: You’re kind of a unique case, at
least in the oral histories that I’ve done, in that
you’ve basically been at the same location for
your whole ORSA career.
Pete Reid: Except the fact that if you add up
all my travel and look at the nights away from
home, it’s 50 percent of my career. Every time
I sensed that Walt Hollis was going to call and
ask me to do one more thing, I’d go back and
check. I’d been away from home half the nights
that I worked. One time Walt wanted me to
take the operational test job at Fort Hood and I
had just been reorganized at AMSAA with a
new set of subordinate technical leaders. John
McCarthy became the AMSAA director and said,
‘‘Good grief. Why can’t somebody like Hank
Dubin run the Fort Hood test group for a while?’’
Bill Dunn: I see in your re´sume´ you had
a six- or seven-month assignment at OSD.
Pete Reid: Yes, for the Department of De-
fense reorganization—the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. I ran that study. I had all the services work-
ing for me. We succeeded in getting the only pa-
per signed off on by all the service secretaries.
Bill Dunn: How did you get selected to be
the person to run that?
Pete Reid: Walt Hollis. He had one of his
SESs who said he wanted out, so Walt called
AMSAA and said, ‘‘How about having Pete
Reid come down and do it?’’ I was actually
working for the Army senior staff for that on be-
half of all the service secretaries. I had interac-
tion with all of them.
Bill Dunn: You were physically located in
the Pentagon for seven months?
Pete Reid: Right where that airplane went
through south parking on 9/11 is where my of-
fice was.
Bill Dunn: What are you doing these days? I
know you’re on the Friends of Harford (Harford
County, Maryland).
Pete Reid: Friends of Harford Board of Direc-
tors. I started their website and now it’s been
taken over by a guy who does more detailed
work than I’m interested in doing, but we have
a lot of interaction. I was on the Army Alliance
up through the time we got Fort Monmouth set-
tled in our favor and then I resigned. I’d been on
it for nine years. That was enough. I do some
work in support of a local soup kitchen. Rachael
and I are both lay members of the annual Meth-
odist conference. We go to those meetings, come
back, and tell everybody what happened.
I have had some consultant contracts dur-
ing the time since I’ve been retired, and there’s
one right now having to do with writing up
the contributions of TRAC and AMSAA field
deployment teams to the Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts. This will entail illustrating the benefits
to the organization and to the Army and to the
individuals and so on. That may or may not
happen. It’s been in progress for some time, ini-
tiated by Mike Bauman. I did a contract where
we looked at the Bosnia materiel lessons learned
and I worked directly with the AMSAA staff on
that. I did a contract along with Ray Pollard for
John Lockard at OSD Test and Evaluation
(T&E), on industry T&E best practices.
That was an extremely interesting task. We
visited some of the best in American industry,
Motorola, Boeing, Cummins Engine, half a dozen
other places. That was good. We got their ideas
for best practices of T&E. I did a task for the
JTCG/ME having to do with writing up textual
description of their many models that are used
to support that operation, which have now
found their way on to the Internet.
Bill Dunn: How about the Defense Science
Board or Army Science Board?
Pete Reid: I did a lot of work with them when
I was still working full time; I haven’t since. I
worked with them rather extensively probably
eight or 10 times over the years, on their sum-
mer studies.
Bill Dunn: I’ve been on the receiving end of
those quite a few times, but I’ve never been on
the Board itself. Anything else that you’d like
to get off your chest?
Pete Reid: I’d just emphasize that in my view
AMSAA is doing just as well today as I thought
we did back years ago. Forrest Crain is doing
a great job. The enthusiasm there is high. Spirits
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are good. They have a lot of great tasks and have
a bright future. I’m always impressed whenever
I go in there. I write the alumni newsletter for
AMSAA. I put that out twice a year, and I go
in there to collect the information. I’m always
impressed by what’s going on and how well
they’re doing. I think that Forrest has been a
godsend for them. He does a great job. He has
a very competent staff.
I think it is especially important to empha-
size that little is accomplished by individuals
in this business. Teams of people with a range
of talents provide the keys to success.
Bill Dunn: Forrest brings the warfighter fo-
cus to the table.
Pete Reid: Yes. He’s one of the few.
Mike Garrambone: Sum up what you think
about your ORSA career.
Pete Reid: Hey, I loved it! Very fortunately I
have a very supportive wife. Rachael never com-
plained about all the time I spent away from home.
The following transcript is from the MORS
Heritage Session at the 70th MORS Symposium
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 20, 2002.
Mr. Reid was asked to describe the history of
ORSA at the Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Mike Garrambone: Let’s start off with our
first speaker, Mr. Pete Reid. Mr. Reid is defi-
nitely an Army guy, no question about it. He is
well schooled, the kind of individual that went
to all the ‘‘right places.’’ He spent some time
at the BRL; he’s a wargamer, a former Chief
of AMSAA’s Combat Operations Division. He
has ‘‘stick time’’ as Acting Technical Director at
Army OTEA. You ladies and gentlemen remem-
ber OTEA—ah yes, there are many of you in this
room, that’s cool. And he has been a consultant
ever since he retired in 1996. He has been a long-
time member of MORS. He has presented many
technical papers. He is definitely an analyst, cer-
tainly well respected in the community, and
has had the occasion to save my butt from time
to time; he was definitely a mentor to many
other analysts. At this point, I’m going to ask
Mr. Reid to come forward and tell us about
ORSA at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Sir, the
stage is yours.
Pete Reid: Thank you very much Mike. I see
many of you are Methodists because you are
seated in the back rows [group laughter]. This
was fun getting some information together for
this meeting. Kind of hard to find people who
were around in the beginnings of Systems Anal-
ysis at Aberdeen, but it did start before the
1920s. I believe the first practitioner was Lieu-
tenant Robert Kent. Kent was assigned to the
Proving Ground during World War I to assist
in carrying out developmental tests of weapons.
He visited battlefields to study weapons’ suc-
cesses and problems, and he carried out se-
quences of ‘‘test-model-test’’ a few decades
before that term became popular. Later, as a ci-
vilian, Dr. Robert Kent served as associate direc-
tor of the BRL.
In the early days, there were Terminal
Ballisticians, Ordnance Corps people, who
worked with the medical community, and ex-
tended analysis beyond delivery accuracy. They
brought in animals as surrogate targets to help
learn about soldier survivability. Early work
on soldier survivability continued into the
ground combat vehicles. Later it expanded to
especially emphasize aircraft, and they literally
had the third largest aircraft fleet in the world at
Aberdeen. Then they began to do the compo-
nent vulnerability and survivability work in
the 1940s and 1950s. Morgan Smith was kind
of the leader of that work in what was initially
called the Ordnance Engineering Laboratory
of the BRL. Morgan presented his paper on air-
craft passive defense in 1951, and used a Soviet
combat airplane as an example of putting one
massive component in front of another, spaced
such that you would have a better chance of
not having two control wires cut with one frag-
ment, etc. This knowledge has been transferred
over the years to every airplane built in this
country, and most of the combat aircraft used
by our friends.
I thought I’d share a few quotes. Sir Isaac
Newton said, ‘‘If I have seen further, it is by
standing on shoulders of giants.’’ I had a great
time for more than 40 years at Aberdeen, and
the best thing I did was hire a lot of bright peo-
ple. I always made it a policy to find people who
were a heck of a lot smarter than I was to have
around, and I have always reaped the benefits
of that idea.
Dave Hardison had a comment that hung
on my wall for years, ‘‘It is possible to make infi-
nite amounts of progress without accomplishing
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anything.’’ Mr. Vandiver honors the Center for
Army Analysis (CAA) Study Directors each year,
after they have completed what they set out to
do. The CAA recognizes how hard it is to satis-
factorily complete a study task. I also remember
Wilbur Payne stating that ‘‘most of us started in
this business working with nuclear weapons.’’
If you were around in this business 40 or 50 years
ago, you probably were working on nuclear
weapons in one way or another. I worked on
evaluation of the Honest John trivariate fuze per-
formance and on the selection of nuclear yields
for several missiles.
Roger Willis, my first boss at the BRL, said,
‘‘We can do anything.’’ One thing that was said
about Roger Willis by our staff, by knowledge-
able people in the Pentagon, and elsewhere in
Washington, was that he literally carried the en-
tire BRL on his shoulders, in terms of gathering
funding for projects and so on. I just benefited
greatly by having him as my first boss there.
He was a skilled mathematician who under-
stood theories and applications as well as any-
body; he was a relentless worker, and he had
combat experience across several battlefields
during World War II. One of the important stud-
ies that Roger led was called the ‘‘Future Role of
Guided Weapons.’’
Herb Weiss was the first Chief of the Ord-
nance Engineering Laboratory, and he also be-
came the first Chief of the Weapons Systems
Laboratory in the early 1950s. He soon left
and went to Northrop, I think. Then Frank
Grubbs became the Chief of that laboratory. Some
of the notable people who were in the laboratory
were Floyd Hill, who many of you I’m sure
know; Art Stein; Fred King on Air Defense; and
Morgan Smith, who became the third Chief of
the Laboratory. I had a group in the Weapons Sys-
tems Laboratory called the War Games Branch.
We also had the classical surface-to-air, armor, in-
fantry, aircraft, and artillery branches, and we
had a ground vehicles branch.
The Army Materiel Systems Analysis
Agency was formed out of the BRL Weapons
Systems Laboratory at the direction of Army
Materiel Command in 1968. Joe Sperrazza was
chosen as the first Director, followed by Keith
Myers; then John McCarthy; and now Dave
Shaffer [Dave was the Director at the time of this
presentation in 2002; the Director at the time of
this publication, in 2012, is Dr. William Forrest
Crain].
Somebody decided that you couldn’t have
a Class II organization called an Agency; you
had to call it an ‘‘Activity.’’ I think the same
guy who made that decision, years later told
me I had to take the eagle off the top of my flag-
staff because I was not a commissioned officer.
So after we’d been in existence for a few years,
in approximately 1972, we changed our name
from Agency to Activity. We started out with
130 people, at our peak we were up to a little
more than 420 people, and then in 2002, we
went back down to a little under 200.
In 1976, a few slight changes occurred.
My organization title went from War Games to
Tactical Operations, and we broadened the
scope of what we did. We added logistics; we
added reliability, availability, maintainability
(RAM) and all the other ‘‘ilities.’’ We added
a group that went to the field to find out how
well the equipment was performing once it
was issued to troops. Systems analysis included
battlefield environment, combat simulation,
model validation, test design and evaluation,
combat data collection, and ‘‘greening.’’ Also
many of you, I know, are very familiar with
the JTCG/ME, the Joint Technical Coordinating
Group for Munitions Effectiveness. The director
of AMSAA is the chairman of the JTCG/ME.
Today (2002), AMSAA has an SES techni-
cal director, the JTCG/ME office, and these
line divisions: Strategic and Operational Sup-
port, Close Support, Close Combat, Logistics
Analysis, Acquisition and Industrial Base, and
Management. Some of the key areas of re-
search today are simulation-based acquisi-
tion and of course all the virtual reality work
that backs up the force modeling and other as-
pects leading to the decision on what’s the
best thing for investments. Regarding model-
ing improvements, the ACQUIRE model was
developed by the night vision people at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, and they probably had help
from the Navy and Air Force on certain sensor
capabilities. AMSAA is adding a front end to
that model (2002) to facilitate its use by the
JTCG/ME.
Following are a few examples that illustrate
the kinds of work, and the scope of tasks at
AMSAA.
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AMSAA completed a study of the ‘‘Balkans,
Lessons Learned’’ in the materiel arena. That in-
formation is very hard to find unless a dedicated
team of knowledgeable people is granted access
while a conflict is happening, or very soon after.
AMSAA did have a team deployed throughout
the areas of operations during the first Gulf War
(and during the current conflicts in the Greater
Middle East). The library at Fort Leavenworth,
for example, has a lot of historical lessons
learned about what happened tactically and so
on, but very, very thin resources for looking at
‘‘Materiel Lessons Learned’’ from the Balkans.
The Physics of Failure program is hard to
sell for some reason. The Department of De-
fense could save literally billions of dollars by
studying what is going to fail when you put
component A with component B, using material
C, with interface Y, and so on, before choosing
a specific design. There are databases available
to know what works and what doesn’t work,
but not enough people are taking advantage of
these. This can be applied all the way from de-
sign through developmental and operational
testing, yet not enough of it gets done. There is
some work on the mechanical aspects of Physics
of Failure at Aberdeen Test Center. There are
two big centers of knowledge here. One is at
the University of Maryland Center for Ad-
vanced Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE) and
another at the University of Iowa. The Univer-
sity of Maryland emphasizes electronic sys-
tems; Iowa covers mechanical systems.
Another major area of research is spares
planning. Every time AMSAA has been asked
to analyze the plans for provisioning spare
parts for a new system, the project manager
and manufacturer of that system have agreed
the results saved costs, cut down on total num-
ber of needed spares, and improved opera-
tional availability.
Now I just wanted to spend a couple of
minutes going through some of my personal
experiences. Soon after I became a civilian at
Aberdeen, I was dispatched to Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama, to spend some time with some of the
giants of missile development: Bill McCorkle,
Henry Diem, Rex Powell, and Art Poe. I just
happened to be there during the time of the pa-
rade celebrating our first successful satellite
launch. I was there when Dr. Von Braun took
the stage in the center of Huntsville, Alabama.
He observed, ‘‘We’ve got a new form of moon-
shine up above.’’ Herman Kahn, who surely
most of you will recognize as one of the ge-
niuses of our time, ran a seminar at his place
up at Croton-on-Hudson, New York. I was for-
tunate to take part, and that led to many years
of exchanges where I was the main beneficiary.
I spent a lot of time with Walt Hollis, and one
of my most fun times with him was in Brussels
for a week. We had dinner together six straight
evenings. He’d order one thing, I’d order the
other, and then we’d share half and half. We or-
dered the same meal at the same small family-
operated restaurant every evening, and then
we would go over the day’s discussions. I spent
a lot of nights with Wilbur Payne, sometimes
until dawn, on my back porch while listening
to fish splash in the channel out behind the
house. Another hero of mine is Larry Linderer.
When I was a GI at Aberdeen, one of the studies
I worked on was called The Future Role of
Guided Weapons, and I quickly found that
the target areas that were being used to evaluate
performance of various concepts were just arbi-
trarily sized squares, rectangles, straight lines,
and circles, having nothing to do with the battle-
field, or any semblance of the real estate a unit
on the battlefield might occupy. I had no train-
ing in doing this, but I started putting things
down on a map. Colonel Larry Linderer was
the CONARC (Continental Army Command,
a predecessor of the Army Training and Doc-
trine Command [TRADOC]) Liaison Officer to
Aberdeen Proving Ground. He passed my office
door one day and noticed I was standing on
a desk, writing on a map, and he came in and
looked at it and helped me fix it. We used the re-
sultant methodologies in joint studies compar-
ing the contributions of aircraft and artillery,
notably a comparison of the Lance and the
F-4C. The Office, Secretary of Defense tasked
the latter study to the BRL. Ritz Hare was an-
other fabulous guy who helped me. In his first
job at the Operations Research Office of Johns
Hopkins he shared an office with Dr. Wilbur
Payne. Later we had contracts with a company,
Operations Research, Incorporated, which Ritz
went on to work with. Still later he joined the
faculty of the University of North Dakota,
Fargo. I had him come to Aberdeen one summer
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and he helped build the DACOTAH model,
‘‘Dreadfully Accurate Computing of Tice and
Hare.’’ Jerry Tice was a young mathematician
on our staff. DACOTAH then became the back-
ground for the Combined Arms Team (CAT)
Training Simulator that was used by TRADOC
for years.
When bomblet artillery rounds were being
fielded, we were concerned about personnel tar-
gets hearing the sound events, many seconds
before the bomblets would reach the ground.
We wanted to know how much cover the target
personnel could obtain before the explosion. In
other words, could they hear the weapons sig-
natures and take effective cover in such things
as ditches and foxholes, or could they get under
other kinds of cover, and significantly degrade
the bomblet performance? We wanted to mea-
sure how well they might recognize the sound
signatures of those rounds opening. The Safety
Officer wouldn’t let us do it at Aberdeen, but
they did let us do it at Jefferson Proving Ground,
Indiana. I stupidly took sound recorders into
the impact area. We didn’t have any remote
way to turn them on, so we turned them on
when the Range Control Officer told us splash
(bomblet release from the carrying artillery
shell) was about to occur, and then ran back to
a tower and jumped in behind some sheets of
tin roofing material, and waited for the event
to happen. We got a lot of sound signatures
and time measurement that way. We turned
the project over to the Human Engineering Lab-
oratory; they had good instrumentation, and
did a good job of it. There were artillery firings
that we were collecting signatures on at Jeffer-
son, and later I observed some 4.2-inch mortar
rounds at Aberdeen. If the artillery rounds
had been as far long as those mortar rounds
were short, I would not be able to give you this
briefing today.
Now we will talk about assignments to bat-
tlefields. I volunteered to collect the weapons
effects data following the 1973 War in the Mid-
dle East along with a few other guys from
AMSAA, one from the Naval Postgraduate
School, and another from Fort Knox. And that
was a good project to work on. In one part of
the effort, we got to look over 800 damaged
tanks—Soviet, British, and US manufactured.
One British Centurion had 31 holes in it. There
was no way to know which impact killed it, or
whether 31 holes all occurred in a few hours,
a few weeks, or any set period of time. It did
appear that the tank had been a target in more
than one battle. So the data that you make the
most out of are the targets with only one or
two penetrations. It was interesting, and I got
to do a lot of other things while I was in the
Middle East. You will often hear people say
what a champ the tube-launched, optically-
tracked, wire-guided (TOW) Missile System
was in the 1973 Middle East War. In fact, not
one single TOW round was fired during the
1973 Middle East War. Thirty-two of those
rounds were fired after the war was declared
to be over, mainly for training, but some during
the continuing war of attrition. The TOW was
not delivered over there in time to take part
in the war.
The BRL had one of the world’s few large
digital computers. We had the first such com-
puter, ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator
And Computer), but it had been turned off by
the time I arrived on the scene in 1956. I worked
with the ENIAC successors. The fun thing to
do, when you got over to the office early in the
morning, perhaps before dawn, was to see
whether or not you had a successful computer
run from the night before. It was nothing like
submitting a problem and looking at the results
seconds later, as we do today. It was like submit-
ting a problem and keeping your fingers crossed
that you got a successful run by next morning.
Joy only occurred about two or three times a
week. So things moved at a slower pace at the
time. It did force the analysts to think through
the solution boundaries so as to conserve the
use of the computers for the more likely possi-
bilities. That may have helped to create better
analysts.
I got to do a lot of riding around in heli-
copters at the machine gun course at Fort
Rucker, Alabama, and along with a bunch of
friends through the Mitla and Gidi passes in
the Sinai. There used to be a group out at Fort
Ord, California, the Combat Developments Ex-
perimentation Center (CDEC); probably there
is no one here to remember that, but Mr. Hollis
would remember it very well. They trained to
fly combat operations at night. I’ll tell you, it
was really scary to ride with those guys. They
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had no night vision equipment at that time.
They relied on whatever moonlight and their
knowledge of the terrain at Fort Hunter Liggett,
California. They would fly UH-1 gunships with
the skids down at the treetop level.
I also worked on some source selection
tasks, some of which were fun, as was some of
the Federal Executive Institute training.
I first met Mike Garrambone, your session
co-chair at the Joint Command, Control, and
Communications Counter Measures (C3CM) test
facility at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.
I worked on the group for Materiel Lessons
Learned for the Grenada operation. I’m going
to talk about that just briefly in a second. I spent
a summer (1979) in England at the Royal Arma-
ment Research and Development Establish-
ment. We were working on a US problem with
electronic warfare, because they had the only
large scale combat model that included commu-
nications jamming and other electronic repre-
sentations at that time. It is probably still true
today (2002).
Generating lessons learned is very valuable.
Here are some Grenada Lessons Learned exam-
ples. The boxes in which the machine gun bul-
lets were packed were made of cardboard. As
soon as they got wet, the boxes fell apart, and
bullets spilled all over. Grenada is formed
largely from coral. As the wheeled vehicles
drove across the terrain, the coral constantly
tore up the rubber tires. It is important to note
that in the radiotelephone handsets, that black
plastic stuff breaks up very easily when it is
slammed down in haste. I had a passionate plea
from a sergeant at the Ranger Battalion at Fort
Lewis, Washington who said, ‘‘When you get
mud on a zipper, you cannot close your zipper.
Please put buttons back on the fly.’’
At that time, Dr. Payne was running
things out at White Sands. For a couple of years
TRADOC had no division-level combat models,
so he came to us and asked us to do some stud-
ies using AMSAA’s division-level model. We
did a couple of studies for him including the
Mine-Countermine Study and the Second Echelon
Interdiction Study.
I learned much from S. L. A. Marshall, our
most well-known military historian. Maybe the
most important thing he passed on to me was
that participants in a firefight forget 50 percent
of the important details within three days. Don’t
count on interview information months after a
conflict. Be there and collect valuable informa-
tion on the battlefield.
We worked on Integrated Intelligent
Vetronics, or VINT2, kind of a corrupted acro-
nym. It is a system for displaying positional,
battlefield environment, and friend-or-foe in-
formation in the fighting compartment of com-
bat vehicles or aircraft along with the health
of the vehicle. An Army Science Board in-
vented the concept in the 1970s. The Army Re-
search Institute carried out some relevant
experiments in following years. I understand
that within the last few years someone re-
started this idea.
I was readingResearch &Development (R&D)
magazine one time and I found that the Natick
Laboratories in Massachusetts had some geo-
morphologists who obviously were under-
employed. I asked my brightest young staff
member to please run up there and see if we
could find out whether they could tell us how
much of the earth’s crust might be defined ac-
cording to intervisibility differences. So if we
run a study on one swatch of terrain, we will
then know how generally applicable that study
might be. Natick had a stereo plotter, and with
our $100,000 they did a lot of data collection
and analysis, to include flying some airplanes
over East Germany in order to take the terrain
samples that we wanted.
There was a message called ‘‘Kerwin
Sends’’ when ‘‘Dutch’’ Kerwin was the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army. He said ‘‘Alright,
get with it and include the environment in your
studies.’’ I kept his telegram on my wall right
alongside quotes from people for years, and
we signed him on as a consultant many years
later. I took him around to see that I had kept
his message. I was delighted when Walt Hollis
asked us to produce an update on how well
Army studies organizations were complying
with ‘‘Kerwin Sends’’, so we did that also.
And we were pleased to tell Dr. Hollis [he
holds an honorary doctorate from North-
eastern] that all the Army Studies Groups
were doing a good job of addressing battle-
field environments.
Now for some personal observations. It is
useful to do things that give you a visualizing
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. AREND ‘‘PETE’’ REID
Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012 Page 131
result but I found some people do that graphical
thing and say, ‘‘Gee whiz, it looks great’’, but
they don’t have any real logic behind it. There
were a lot of reconstructions of a CDEC test,
for example, by a certain national laboratory. It
turns out they had nothing in there that made
force-on-force combat sense; all they were doing
was emulating the flow of battle in the CDEC
experiment. Not good. There were no repre-
sentations of physical processes that could be
changed so as to learn something about alter-
natives such as weapons accuracy, range or le-
thality or slight changes in tactics. We did learn
a lot about things from doing our studies based
on map analyses. We had a lot of good consul-
tants. General Julian Ewell urged us to add
more detailed modeling of tactical aircraft in
our ground combat models, which we did.
We found that it is awfully hard to get the detail
you need in order to prove that your force-on-
force models are a faithful way to predict how
a combat event may turn out by looking at his-
torical records. It is awfully hard to do. We
were successful in getting some of that. It is aw-
fully hard to get details, time, space, and losses—
with their causes. I spent a lot of time in Israel
collecting that sort of combat information. As I
mentioned earlier, I learned a lot from S. L. A.
Marshall, a leading Army historian, who sup-
ported AMSAA as a consultant. He stated that
soldiers who do the most interesting things
are very busy and they often report inaccurate
details.
I have bumped elbows with a great bunch
of people over the years. I mentioned Roger
Willis earlier as my first boss, and the one
who set me on a path that I stayed on for a lot
of years. There are lots of people from Fort
Leavenworth and many from White Sands—I
just can’t mention them all here. Also there
are the Israelis, who helped to supply detailed
combat data. General Mordecai Gur, who was
the Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff in
1974, gave us permission to try to replay some
of the 1973 Middle East battles, so as to allow us
to evaluate the adequacy of our combat model.
Later, that same combat information was trans-
ferred to Seth Bonder, who used it to verify
some of his modeling for a specific study, and
to CAA where Bob McQuay used it as well.
Ehud Barak was the head of the Israeli state
until General Sharon replaced him a couple
of years ago. Barak was an armor battalion
commander in the 1973 Middle East War, and
as a colonel, he spent 2½ months in AMSAA’s
wargame facility in 1974. Currently (2012),
Barak is serving as Israeli Defense Minis-
ter. Bren Adan is a general officer in whose
division Barak served; he came to AMSAA
for a few days to help with the combat data
analyses.
I want to mention Rafael Eitan because he
became a Chief of Staff later on, but when I first
ran into him, he was the Commander of the
Rafael Division in the Golan Heights. My first
exposure with him was when he came along
in his Jeep and took the rifle that one of my
guards was carrying. The kid had to relieve
himself and he set his rifle down. Eitan noticed
he was separated from his rifle, so he took it. I
had to go over to his headquarters that evening
and persuade him to let us have the rifle back. If
you go to the restroom while you’re on duty as
a guard in the Israeli Army, you don’t let go of
your rifle.
I have known Walt Hollis in various incarna-
tions. He worked seventeen years at Frankford
Arsenal and several years at CDEC as the Chief
Scientist. I served with him on source selection
tasks several times when he was at CDEC. Then
when General Ochs was reassigned from CDEC
Commander to the newly formed Operational
Test and Evaluation Agency, or OTEA, he
brought Walt in there as his Chief Scientist. Then
finally he got a job that he has been able to hold
onto in the Pentagon.
Now a bottom line concerning combat data
collection. If you are ever assigned to go collect
combat data, make sure your questions pass
the ‘‘so what’’ test. Will having the answer
make a difference, that is, would any action
be taken as a result of having the answer to
the question? About 99% of the questions peo-
ple ask, they may get the answer, but nothing
would be done as a result. It would be better
to not bother soldiers by asking those dumb
questions. Only ask the ones that are germane.
Every time we have gone to the Middle East to
collect data, and we’ve done it four times now
going back to the 1968 War, the Israelis are de-
manding quid pro quos. They know that at
the working level it is not a problem, but the
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politicians get involved, and they delay our ac-
cess to information for months. Actually in the
1978 War it was delayed for about ten months
before we finally got over there. I know that
the delay in access to the information that is
useful made much of the ‘‘data collection’’ time
and effort that was spent after that battle essen-
tially irrelevant. The team never got access to
most of the people who could provide useful
information. The foreign military sales con-
tracts ought to provide a means to avoid all of
that stuff, but they don’t.
Finally, when it comes to motivating, men-
toring, and convincing your staff, make a record
for playback over and over: Yes you can, yes you
can,. YES YOU CAN!
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